The Dolev-Yao model is a simple and useful framework in which to analyze security protocols, but it assumes that the adversary is extremely limited. We show that it is possible for the results of this model to remain valid even if the adversary is given additional power. In particular, we show that there exist situations in which Dolev-Yao adversary can be viewed as a valid abstraction of all realistic adversaries. We do this in a number of steps:
Introduction
How can we tell if a cryptographic protocol is secure? Phrased another way, how can we be sure that a given protocol meets a given security goal? Before we can analyze a protocol we need to choose a model : a collection of assumptions and proof methods. is assumed to be an arbitrary algorithm. The cryptographic primitives are assumed to be algorithms (or tuples of algorithms) that satisfy some asymptotic property even in the presence of an arbitrary adversary.
To prove a protocol secure in this model, one would use a reduction from the protocol to the underlying primitive. That is, one would show that if there exists an adversary with a significant chance of successfully attacking the protocol, then it can be used to construct an adversary with a significant chance of breaking some cryptographic primitive. If the protocol uses encryption, for example, then one would reduce the security of the protocol to the security of the encryption scheme. Thus, an attack that can successfully break the protocol can be transformed into an attack that can successfully break the encryption scheme. Similarly, if the protocol is based on signatures, the one would show that an attack on the protocol can be transformed into one that can forge a signature. By doing so, one can conclude that if the underlying cryptographic primitives (encryption, signatures) are secure then the protocol must be secure also. (See [5] for an example.) This is a fairly strong model for analysis. The only assumption placed on the adversary is that it is efficient: executing in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) . 1 This assumption is fairly weak, giving the model a solid and meaningful grounding in complexity theory. On the other hand, this model is extremely difficult to use. Reductions tend to be fairly tedious to design, and must be produced 'by hand' for each protocol.
Fortunately, there are alternate models such as the Dolev-Yao model [7] . In this setting, messages are assumed to be elements of some abstract algebra, and encryption is an abstract operation on that algebra. The adversary is assumed to be a specific (albeit non-deterministic) state machine, and the only way for the adversary to produce new messages is to perform certain operations on messages it already "knows".
This model has an extremely nice feature: simplicity. Because the computation model is symbolic and the adversary is restricted, it is possible to explicitly represent all of the adversary's possible behaviors in a compact way. General theorems can be proven about the limits of the adversary's powers, and it is relatively easy to show the adversary's goals to be outside its range of possible behaviors. This simplicity allows a great deal of automation. Although the problem of protocol security is undecidable in general [8] , it is decidable for an important sub-class of protocols [24] . Furthermore, several automated tools have been successfully used. (See [14, 23, 26] for typical examples. Also see [16] for a recent survey of the field.) However, this model also has a drawback: the Dolev-Yao adversary is actually quite weak. Although it can pick from among the allowed operations non-deterministically, the set of allowed operations is fixed and quite small. It is unclear whether security against this restricted adversary implies security against more realistic adversary models. It is also unclear how security statements from the Dolev-Yao model transfer to the computational model.
It seems that one must choose between the simplicity of the Dolev-Yao model and the solid grounding of the computational model. However, is this choice necessary? Are the two models irreconcilable? In particular, is it necessarily true that Dolev-Yao proofs of security will have no computational meaning? This is a large question, and in this paper we only discuss one small part: the adversary. In particular, we show that the use of sufficiently strong primitives from computational cryptography forces an equivalence of sorts between the Dolev-Yao adversary and all computational adversaries. That is, we do four things:
• We describe the Dolev-Yao model, and extract a natural computational security condition that summarizes its strong assumptions regarding the adversary (Sections 3 and 4).
• We investigate a previous effort in this area [2] that related, in the symmetrickey setting, the passive Dolev-Yao adversary to the passive computational one. In particular, this effort showed that if two Dolev-Yao messages are indistinguishable to the passive Dolev-Yao adversary, then the natural interpretations of these two messages in the computational setting will be indistinguishable to the passive computational adversary. We translate this result to the public-key setting (Section 5).
• We show that this indistinguishability property is no more powerful than other, standard definitions of security from computational cryptography (also Section 5).
• Lastly, we show that our more natural security condition is no more powerful than the indistinguishability property (Section 6).
We finish by discussing avenues for future work (Section 7). First, however, we discuss other efforts in this same area.
Related Work
The question we discuss has already been partially addressed in work by Abadi and Rogaway ( [1, 2] , and continued in [10] and [17, 18] ) which served as a great source of inspiration for this work. In particular, these authors derived and implemented the indistinguishability property that will play such a central role here. The indistinguishability property we define and use in this paper is a direct analogue of theirs, translated from the symmetric-encryption setting to that of asymmetric encryption. Because of differences between these two settings, our indistinguishability property will be stronger than theirs in some places and weaker than theirs in others. More importantly, we will go on to relate our indistinguishability property to the property of malleability. That is, we show that the computational adversary can be prohibited from producing any message that could not also be produced by the Dolev-Yao adversary.
The relationship between indistinguishability and non-malleability depends on the setting (see [4] for an examination of this issue). In the purely computational setting, for example, non-malleability is strictly stronger than indistinguishability if the computational adversary only has access to the public key. However, non-malleability and indistinguishability are equivalent against the chosen-ciphertext attack (i.e, when the adversary has constant access to a decryption oracle, as it will in Definition 12). We will show that indistinguishability implies a weak form on non-malleability in that encryption that satisfies our Dolev-Yao indistinguishability property also satisfies our Dolev-Yao nonmalleability property. The converse is commonly true in other settings, and is likely to be true here as well. However, this remains an open question for time being.
Another two related research efforts in this area are those of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner [3] , and Micciancio and Warinschi [19] . In general, these investigations represent protocol executions in two different ways: a "real" setting and an "ideal" setting. In the "real" setting, the execution of a protocol is represented as the communication of Turing machines that use computational encryption to create bit-string messages. The two lines of research differ in their representation of the "ideal" setting. Backes et. al. use a 'database' that stores all messages and tracks which ones are known by whom. This database allows the adversary to access only those messages it would be able to deduce in the Dolev-Yao paradigm. Micciancio and Warinschi, on the other hand, represent the ideal setting directly as symbolic execution in the Dolev-Yao model. The main results of both efforts state that any behavior that an honest participant can see in the "real" setting could also be seen in the "ideal" setting. Hence, a proof of security in the "ideal" setting will serve as a proof in the "real" setting (modulo negligible probabilities).
These works are extremely compelling. However, they focus attention onto the behavior of the adversary as a whole. That is, they regard the adversary's behavior as an unknowable mystery which cannot be broken into component parts. We, on the other hand, regard the behavior of the adversary as a series of message creations, and leverage a statement about a single creation into a statement about the adversary's behavior as a whole.
A less similar approach to the same problem is a recent effort to incorporate polynomial-time indistinguishability into process algebras [12, 13, 15, 20, 21] . Process algebras introduce grammars for processes that typically encompass a large number of higher-level programming constructs. They also introduce a number of algebraic rewrite and cancellation laws that allow one to prove two processes equivalent, that their observable behaviors are equivalent, or that the observable behavior of one process is a subset of the observable behavior of another. In this framework, one can prove a given process to be "safe" by showing that its observable behavior is the same as, or a subset of, the observable behavior of an idealized "specification" process.
This idea has recently been expanded to include new types of "equivalent" behavior. In particular, the definitions of both process and observable behavior have been expanded to include probabilistic behavior. This allows the definition of "observationally equivalent" to mean "indistinguishable to any polynomial-time environment or distinguisher." This approach does not provide the tools necessary to prove an original indistinguishability result, but it does allow one to prove that some given indistinguishability result follows from another one. Furthermore, this derivation uses the high-level rewrite and cancellation rules of the algebra rather than direct reductions.
The Dolev-Yao Model
We begin our work by exploring the powers of the adversary in the Dolev-Yao model. There are actually several variations on the Dolev-Yao model, each tailored to a specific tool or application. We provide and discuss a generic example which uses public-key encryption. In this setting, messages are assumed to be elements of an algebra A of values. There are four types of atomic messages:
• Identifiers (public, predictable, denoted by I)
• Random nonces (private, unpredictable, denoted by R), • Public keys (K P ub ), and
Compound messages are created by two deterministic operations:
We write {|M |} K for enc(K, M ) and M N for pair(M, N ). 2 We require that there be a bijection inv : K P ub → K P riv and by K −1 we mean inv (K) when K is a public key and inv −1 (K) when K is a private key.
Although we will consider only public-key encryption in this paper, one could also easily add symmetric encryption to the Dolev-Yao model by introducing a new key type on which the inv operation is the identity function.
The algebra is assumed to be free: every value has a unique representation.
In the Dolev-Yao model, there are two kinds of active parties: honest participants and the adversary. The honest participants follow the steps of the protocol without deviation. They can engage in multiple runs of the protocol simultaneously and with different parties. Some versions of the model also contain the internal states of honest participants, others do not. We will not consider them in this paper.
The network is assumed to be completely under the control of the adversary, who can record, delete, replay, reroute, reorder, and completely control the scheduling of messages. This is modeled by letting the adversary be the network: the honest participants send their messages only to the adversary and receive messages only from the adversary. Thus, we can consider each execution of the protocol to be an alternating sequence of adversary messages (q i ∈ A) and environment responses (r i ⊆ A): r 0 q 1 r 1 q 2 r 2 . . . q n−1 r n−1 q n r n Typically, each message or response will be accompanied by such auxiliary information as nominal sender, intended receiver, and so forth. We will ignore this auxiliary information in this work. Such issues as scheduling and routing of messages are considered in the Dolev-Yao analysis of a protocol, which will assume that the adversary can choose the recipient and auxiliary information for its messages with total non-determinism. Hence, the Dolev-Yao analysis will capture any strategy chosen by the efficient adversaries of the computational model in choosing the routing information of their messages. In this work, we will focus on the limited non-determinism allowed to the Dolev-Yao adversary in choosing its messages' contents.
The main limitation on the choice of message content is that every query q i must be derivable from what is known initially and r 0 , r 1 , r 2 . . . r i−1 . The initial knowledge of the adversary includes at least the following:
(1) the public keys (K P ub ), (2) the private keys of subverted participants (K Adv ⊆ K P riv ), (3) the identifiers of the principals (I), and (4) the nonces the adversary itself generates (R Adv ⊆ R) which are assumed to be distinct from all nonces generated by honest participants.
(Note that the the adversary must receive a set r 0 before it sends its first message. This message can be thought of as an "initialization" from the environment which provides the adversary with any extra information that might be available to it in a particular setting.)
The Dolev-Yao model places severe restrictions on what messages are derivable from others. Analyses in this model tend to focus on the structure of protocols. That is, they wish to identify those properties of protocols that exist independently of the encryption schemes used to implement them. Hence, the Dolev-Yao model assumes that the only manipulations the adversary can apply with respect to pairing and encryption are those that must be allowed. The pairing operation must allow pairing and separation, and the encryption operator must allow encryption and decryption (with known keys). Thus, for a given message M to be derivable from a set of messages S, it must be possible to produce it by applying the following operations a finite number of times:
• decryption with known or learned private keys,
• encryption with public keys, • pairing of two known elements, and • separation of a pair into its components.
To combine these two intuitions:
, is the smallest subset of A such that:
It is the central assumption of the Dolev-Yao model that this closure operation represents the limit of the ability of the adversary to create new messages: Definition 2 (Dolev-Yao adversary) Suppose that r 0 q 1 r 1 q 2 r 2 . . . q n−1 r n−1 q n r n is a protocol execution in the Dolev-Yao model, where q 1 , q 2 ,. . . q n ∈ A are messages from the adversary to honest participants and r 0 , r 1 ,. . . r n ⊆ A are the honest participants' responses. Then for all i,
That is, although the Dolev-Yao adversary can choose its messages nondeterministically, it must choose them from within the closure. It is this intuition that we will translate into the computational model.
Relating the Dolev-Yao and Computational Messages
In this section, we formalize the intuition of Definition 2 in the language of computational cryptography, using a series of intermediate attempts. Intuitively, we would like to say that it should be hard for the computational adversary to produce a single message outside the closure of its input. Informally:
Here, Pr[A; B; C : P ] indicates the probability of predicate P being true after running experiments A, B and C in series. The notation x ← D indicates x being drawn from distribution D. If D is a set, the uniform distribution is used. If D is an algorithm, we use the distribution over output induced by the distribution of the input and the distribution of D's random coin flips.
Although this attempt contains the desired intuition, there are two small problems:
• It is unclear how a set S of Dolev-Yao messages can be passed as input to a computational adversary, or how a Dolev-Yao message M can be produced as output.
• It is not clear what a "small" probability is.
The purpose of this section is to make the above definition meaningful. Our main tool for doing so will be a mapping from Dolev-Yao messages to their computational analogues: probability distributions on bit-strings. The mapping we present here is congruent to that given by Abadi and Rogaway [1, 2] , adapted to the public-key encryption setting.
The "encoding" of a message M , written [ [M ] ] t η , is a probability distribution that depends on four things:
• The formal message M , • The tape (t) which is an infinite sequence of bits. We assume for convenience that we have random access to this tape, although this can be easily simulated using a standard tape and some book-keeping. In usage, we will assume that the bits on this tape are random.
• A security parameter, which is a natural number η represented in unary.
This parameter represents the amount of security present in the system. In encryption schemes, for example, the security parameter can be thought of as the size of keys.
• An arbitrary public-key encryption scheme, which in the computational setting is a triple of algorithms: · G is the key generation algorithm, which takes as input a security parameter η, and η bits of randomness. It outputs a public/private key pair. · E is the encryption algorithm, which takes in as input a public key, a plaintext string, and η bits of randomness. The output is the ciphertext. We will write E(x, pk ) for the distribution induced by running E (over all choices of randomness) on plaintext x and public key pk . · D is the decryption algorithm, which takes as input a private key and a string. It is required that D(sk , E(pk , x, σ)) = x for all valid key pairs (pk , sk ), all plaintexts x, and all choices of randomness σ ∈ {0, 1} η . Note that the key generation and encryption algorithms are randomized. The randomness used by these algorithms will be polynomial in the security parameter η; we assume without loss of generality that all of these polynomials are the identity polynomial f (η) = η. Definition 3 (Encoding: messages) Let η ∈ N be the security parameter. Let t ∈ {0, 1} ω be a random tape, partitioned into a length-η segment for each nonce and public key in A. Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme. Then for any M ∈ A, the encoding of M , written
, is defined recursively as: 
t η is mapped to m, "id" where m is any (short) bit-string uniquely associated with M . That is, we do not care how identifiers are mapped to bit-strings so long as each identifier is uniquely represented. We assume that it is efficient to compute the encoding of a given identifier.
t η is the mapping from pairs of distributions to distributions given by 
The bits on the tape are used to represent the coin flips used to make atomic elements, and we will later enforce that the tape is filled with random bits.
Compound terms are made via either bit-string concatenation or a computational encryption scheme. Note that the coin flips used by the encryption algorithm are not taken from the tape. Hence, [
remains a distribution even if t is fixed.
There are two properties of computational public-key encryption that our encoding mapping will need to accommodate. First, public-key encryption is not required to hide the key used to encrypt. We make this possible leak of information explicit in the definition above by explicitly concatenating each ciphertext with the encrypting key.
Secondly, computational public-key encryption is not generally required to hide the length of the plaintext. For this reason, we need to limit the amount of information about a plaintext that will be revealed by its length. We will assume that the length of a message depends only on the message's structure, not any of its component values. More formally, let the type tree of a formal message be the same as its parse tree except that each leaf is replaced by its type. We use the same notation for type trees that we do for messages. Thus, the type tree of a message {|A N |} K (where A ∈ I, N ∈ R and K ∈ K P ub ) is {|I R|} K P ub .
We assume that the length of a formal message M depends only on T M , the type tree of M , and the security parameter. This is not an unreasonable assumption. The above definition of the encoding mapping implies that all nonces encode to the same length. The assumption can be trivially enforced for other type trees by padding out to some maximal length. Thus, we will use
The encoding mapping allows formal messages to be represented as bit-strings, which allows formal messages to be passed to and returned by the computational adversary. This solves the first problem with Attempt 1. Because the mapping also introduced the security parameter, we can solve the second problem. A probability is "small" if it is negligible in the security parameter:
for all sufficiently large η.
(The phrase "for all sufficiently large η" is equivalent to ∃η 0 . ∀η ≥ η 0 .)
With these two problems solved, we can re-attempt to translate Definition 2 into computational terms:
∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufficiently large η :
Here, supp D means the support of distribution D. When the support of a distribution contains one element, we will treat the distribution itself as a singleton set.
This definition is still problematic, however, for two technical reasons. First, the input to the adversary might be of infinite length. The set S may be of infinite length. There may be an infinite number of elements in I, R Adv , K P ub and K Adv . If any of these are the case, then the restriction of the adversary to probabilistic polynomial-time is meaningless. No computational encryption scheme would remain secure against an infinite-time adversary. For this reason, we require that S be of finite size. The sets I, R Adv , K P ub and K Adv might still be infinite, so instead of passing them as input we represent them via oracles:
• M t η (x) returns (the encoding of) the identifier of the xth participant.
• R 
The second problem is that our results rely upon a technical limitation: acyclicity of encryptions. A set of encryptions is acyclic if, when
in some element of S, and K 2 encrypts K −1 3 , and so on, this sequence of keys encrypting keys never loops back on itself. More formally:
Our results will only hold for acyclic sets S. However, protocols analyzed in the Dolev-Yao model typically operate in one of three ways:
• Long-term keys are used to encrypt session keys, which themselves never encrypt other keys, • The present session key is used to encrypt the next session key, but never the previous, or • Keys are never encrypted at all.
None of these cases will produce cyclic encryptions.
Thus, we arrive at our final security condition: ∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufficiently large η :
The main purpose of this section has been to derive this security condition, which directly captures the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao adversary. However, there exist other security conditions that formalize the Dolev-Yao model. We consider one of these in the next section.
An Indistinguishability Lemma
In this section, we consider the indistinguishability-based definitions of DolevYao security originally derived by Abadi and Rogaway [1, 2] . Intuitively, the definition of that paper describes when two formal messages should "look" the same to the formal adversary. A formal adversary has the power to make certain, limited deductions from formal messages; two given formal messages should "look" the same when all possible deductions that can be made about them yield the same results. In particular, the formal adversary of [1, 2] is assumed to be unable to distinguish between two different encryptions (unless it has the corresponding private key or keys). For example, if the adversary of [1, 2] has no other information, the two messages
should be indistinguishable to it no matter what A, B, C and D are.
The fundamental result of Abadi and Rogaway is that if the encoding algorithm uses sufficiently strong computational encryption, then two messages indistinguishable to the formal adversary will encode to distributions indistinguishable to the computational adversary. Their result applies to the case of symmetric encryption, and we will here translate it to the case of public-key encryption. This translation will simultaneously strengthen and weaken the result. Indistinguishability in the public-key setting requires a stronger similarity between messages than was necessary in the case of symmetric encryption. However, our results will be able to tolerate the presence of a previously-absent strong decryption oracle.
Let T be a set of keys and suppose that the formal adversary can decrypt with regard to them. Then we represent the information that such an adversary can deduce from a formal message by its public-key pattern 4 :
Definition 7 (Public-key pattern) Let T ⊆ K P ub . We recursively define the function p(M, T ) to be:
w. (where T M is the type tree of M )
Then pattern pk (M, T ), the public-key pattern of an expression M relative to the set T , is
If S ⊆ A is a set of messages, then pattern pk (S, T ) is
where s 1 , s 2 , . . . are the elements of S is some canonical order. The base pattern of a message M , denoted pattern pk (M ), is defined to be pattern pk (M, ∅), and pattern pk (S) is defined to be pattern pk (S, ∅).
The grammar/algebra for patterns is exactly that of messages, with the addition of a new kind of leaf node: |T M | K (a "blob" of type-tree T M under key K) which represents undecipherable encryptions. Unlike the "blobs" of the symmetric-encryption patterns of [1, 2] , these "blobs" are labeled with K and T M . This is because computational encryption schemes do not necessarily hide either the encrypting key or the plaintext length.
For convenience, we define a useful relationship between two patterns:
if the parse tree of M is a sub-tree of the parse tree of M .
We note that since messages are special forms of patterns, this relationship can be applied between two messages as well as between a message and a pattern. We also note a relationship between a message and its pattern: We can extend the encoding operation to the pattern algebra:
Definition 10 (Encoding: patterns) Let: be the the mapping from distributions to distributions given by
Patterns allow us to state when two messages appear to be the same to the formal adversary: when they have the same pattern. The standard definition of 'appears to be the same' in the world of computational encryption is that of computational indistinguishability. We present a more general definition, which incorporates the possibility of an oracle: 
We note that if no oracle access is granted at all, then the above definition reduces to the standard notion of computational indistinguishability.
Our intuitive notion is that a message and its pattern should appear to be the same. We formalize this notion by saying that a message and its pattern should encode to computationally indistinguishable probability distributions. To make this formalization completely meaningful, however, we must consider what oracle (if any) the adversary can access. This will be determined by the oracles allowed by the underlying computational encryption scheme.
A computational public-key encryption scheme provides indistinguishability against the chosen-ciphertext attack 5 (also written CCA-2 secure in the notation of [4] ) if no adversary has a chance significantly better than random of determining accurately whether a ciphertext c is the encryption of message m 0 or message m 1 , even if:
• the adversary chooses m 0 and m 1 itself, after seeing the given public key, and • the adversary can access a decryption oracle both before choosing the messages and after receiving the ciphertext in question. (The decryption oracle will not decrypt c itself, however.)
More formally:
Definition 12 (Chosen-ciphertext security) A computational public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D) provides indistinguishability under the chosenciphertext attack if ∀ PPT adversaries A, ∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufficiently large η :
The oracle D 1 (x) returns D(x, sk ), and D 2 (x) returns D(x, sk ) if x = c and returns ⊥ otherwise. The adversary is assumed to keep state between the two invocations. It is required that m 0 and m 1 be of the same length.
In the terminology of [1, 2] , this definition requires that encryption be messagehiding. It does not, on the other hand, require that it be key-hiding or lengthhiding. It is for this reason that "blobs" in Definition 7 are labeled with both encrypting key and type-tree (which indicates length of plaintext).
We will assume that the encoding mapping uses CCA-2 secure cryptography. Thus, the oracle we will use in Definition 11-to show that a message and its pattern produce indistinguishable encodings-will exactly mirror the decryption oracles of Definition 12. Those oracles will decrypt, with respect to a given public key, anything but a given "challenge" ciphertext. Our oracles will do the same. However, a message and its pattern can be thought of as possibly many different "challenge" ciphertexts under possibly many different keys. It is simple to define the keys with respect to which our oracles will decrypt:
S is a set of messages, then S| K P ub = {K ∈ K P ub : ∃M ∈ S s. t. K M }.
In addition, the oracle may decrypt with respect to additional keys in some set T . (We use this additional flexibility in the proof of our main theorem.) Due to efficiency concerns, however, the set T must be finite.
It is more difficult to define the "challenge" ciphertexts which our oracle will not decrypt. Most directly, they are those encryptions which differ between
. That is, the challenge ciphertexts should be those which correspond to "blobs" in the pattern of M relative to the set of keys T . However, for convenience, we will define a larger but equivalent set of challenge ciphertexts which correspond not only to the "blobs" but all encryptions visible in M to a Dolev-Yao adversary. Definition 14 (Visible) Let σ be a bit-string, and τ a set of computational public keys. Then let vis τ (σ) be the smallest set so that
• if c, k, "enc" ∈ vis τ (σ), k ∈ τ , and k is the secret key corresponding to k, then D(c, k ) ∈ vis τ (σ), and • if c, k, "enc" ∈ vis τ (σ), k , "privkey" ∈ vis τ (σ), and k is the secret key corresponding to k, then D(c, k ) ∈ vis τ (σ).
A bit-string m is a visible element in σ relative to τ if m ∈ vis τ (σ).
Intuitively, x ∈ vis τ (σ) iff x is an encoding of X, σ is an encoding of M , τ is an encoding of T and X pattern pk (M, T ). That is, a bit-string is a visible element of σ if the adversary can derive it from σ using only DolevYao-style operations using σ and keys in τ . The set vis τ (σ) contains every ciphertext which corresponds to a "blob" in pattern pk (M, T ). However, it also contains every other ciphertext that has an corresponding analogue in pattern pk (M, T ). The decryption oracle will not decrypt these, but this not worrisome: the computational adversary can decrypt these "non-blobs" itself. Just as these encryptions are not "blobbed" in pattern pk (M, T ) because the required formal private key is in T or derivable from M , the adversary can decrypt the corresponding computational ciphertext from keys in τ or derivable from σ itself. Thus, we can prohibit the decryption of this more general set without losing generality. Now that we know the nature of our decryption oracle, we can finally define our indistinguishability property between messages and their patterns: t η , for all acyclic formal messages M and finite T ⊆ K P ub :
(x, pk ) returns ⊥ unless pk is a valid public key and
(The tape t is assumed to be consistent with that used to form the sample from
where sk is the private key corresponding to pk .
In the next section, we will show that Dolev-Yao public-key indistinguishability implies Dolev-Yao weak non-malleability. Before this, however, we show that Dolev-Yao public-key indistinguishability can be satisfied by CCA-2 security. 
PROOF.
Suppose that the encoding mapping uses a computational encryption scheme (G, E, D). Further, suppose that there exists a formal message M , a set of keys T and a PPT adversary A that can distinguish between a sample from We prove this by hybrid argument. Since M is acyclic, we can order the keypairs used in the parse tree of M as
That is, the deeper the key in the encryptions, the smaller the number.
We go about the hybrid argument by constructing a number of intermediate patterns between M and pattern pk (M, T ). In particular, we construct patterns M 0 , M 1 ,. . . M k such that:
, and
That is, between M i and M i+1 we pick a key K and replace all encryptions with that key with blobs of the appropriate length.
We use this typeface for a running example. Suppose
By using the order on keys suggested by the notation, we can let
We will use the hybrid argument on this 
Then we know by a (standard) hybrid argument that two consecutive rows are also distinguishable. 6 We continue the hybrid argument by creating a new table between the two distinguishable rows. Suppose that K i is the key being "blobbed" between the two rows. Then there are a fixed number of encryptions being converted to "blobs". Create a row for each such encryption, so that two consecutive rows differ only in a single encryption being replaced with a blob.
For example, if the two rows are
we decrypt x with the value so produced. If K 0 ∈ M | K P ub \ T , we also check to see if x is visible in s relative to t. We return ⊥ if it is, and decrypt x if it is not. , we create the keys from the tape and decrypt any ciphertext.
The answer from A directly corresponds to the plaintext chosen for c, which allows us to distinguish whether it encrypts [
A(s, η) will eventually return an answer that distinguishes between samples from R 1 and R 2 . The answer from A will signify whether c encrypted p or [
We note as a corollary that the exact analogue of the Abadi-Rogaway result holds: if two messages M and N have the same pattern (with respect to some set T ) then they produce indistinguishable encodings:
Corollary 17 Suppose that M , N are two acyclic messages, T ⊆ A is a set of keys, and
PROOF. By assumption and Theorem 15, we know that
is the same as the oracle O N,T
relation is transitive (by hybrid argument), and so the result follows.
We end by noting that we do not lose generality in this corollary by requiring that M | K P ub = N | K P ub . If M and N have the same pattern but have different public keys in their parse trees, then we can simply form M by pairing with M every key in M | K P ub ∪N | K P ub , and similarly for N . Since we add only public keys, pattern pk (M , T ) = pattern pk (N , T ). However, it is now the case that M | K P ub = N | K P ub and the corollary holds.
Ideal Encryption
Theorem 18 Suppose that (G, E, D) is a computational public-key encryption scheme that provides Dolev-Yao public-key indistinguishability. Then (G, E, D) provides Dolev-Yao weak non-malleability.
PROOF.
Suppose that the theorem is false. Then there is an adversary that is able to produce a message outside the closure of its input set:
∃ polynomials q, for infinitely many η :
We will construct from this adversary a new adversary A 1 that serves as a counter-example to Theorem 15. But first, consider the parse tree of M . Suppose that every path from the root of the parse tree to a leaf passes through an element of C [S] . Then it must be that the root message, M , is in C[S] -a contradiction. Hence, there must be some path in the parse tree of M such that no element along that path is in C[S], including the leaf M l . indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks, the probability of this must be negligible. Again, we find a contradiction.
Thus, the only possibility is that M l is in R \ R Adv or in K P riv \ K Adv , and that M l is in the parse tree of some element of S. However, it cannot be the case that M l itself is in S, or that M l can be produced from S only by separating pairs.
( There remains only one last complication: A has access to oracles while operating. In particular, A can request any public key, any private key in K Adv , any identifier, and any nonce in R Adv . How does A 1 respond to these oracle calls when it simulates A?
The answer is that we slightly modify the set S to include the information needed to respond. In particular, let S| K P ub and S| R Adv be defined analogously to S| K P ub .Then the set S is will actually be
When A 1 receives the input d it strips off d S as before and simulates A. When A makes an oracle call, however, A 1 can respond:
• If the oracle is being asked for an identifier, A 1 computes the representation of that identifier. (As mentioned before, we assume that the encoding of identifiers is efficiently computable.) • If the oracle is being called on an ingredient of S, then the additional information in s contains the needed bit-string.
• Otherwise, the needed value is a random variable independent of d. A 1 can sample from the relevant distribution to produce an indistinguishable value. It then stores the value for future use (and if the value is a key, the corresponding secret or public key also), and returns it.
Since the formal messages we added to S are already in C[S], they do not change the pattern of the original S. Hence, adding them to S does not change the distribution of d S , and A will progress as before.
Conclusion and Open Problems
The primary contribution of this paper is three-fold:
(1) First, we presented a definition of Dolev-Yao weak non-malleability, which directly captures the main assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model. (2) We then translated the definition of Dolev-Yao indistinguishability from the secret-key to the public-key setting, and showed that it is satisfied by encryption that provides indistinguishability under the chosen-ciphertext attack. (3) Lastly, we showed that Dolev-Yao indistinguishability implies Dolev-Yao weak non-malleability.
One obvious extension of this work would be to examine the relationship between Dolev-Yao indistinguishability and non-malleability further. In many settings, non-malleability is either equivalent to or strictly stronger than indistinguishability. The fact that Dolev-Yao indistinguishability implies DolevYao non-malleability is strong evidence for their equivalence in this setting, but the question remains open.
Another interesting way to extend this work would be to strengthen the definition of Dolev-Yao non-malleability. The current definition states, informally, that the adversary has only a negligible chance of "hitting" a given target (i. e., producing an encoding of a given M ). If possible, it would be interesting to find an encryption scheme that keeps the adversary from hitting any target: A third way to improve this work would be to remove the requirment that S be acyclic. (This would most likely also remove the same assumption from the results of Abadi and Rogaway [1] .) Lastly, it would interesting to incorporate into this approach cryptographic operations other than encryption, such as hashes and signatures.
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